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POLICE AUTHORITY TO KILL: AN EXPANDING
RIGHT THAT REQUIRES RESTRICTION
SHEL VIN SINGER*
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sharply criti-
cal of broad police power to kill citizens, held a Missouri statute
authorizing police to use lethal force, when necessary to capture
a person suspected of committing any felony, unconstitutional.'
In June of 1983, the Sixth Circuit declared a similar Tennessee
statute unconstitutional.2 These decisions evince an understand-
ing of the need to restrict common law authority of police to use
lethal force against fleeing felony suspects. That understanding
has not been reflected, however, in a general movement of courts
and state legislatures toward greater restrictions on this crucial
facet of police power. It is argued here that in the framework of
this country's philosophy of crime, punishment, and justice, far
too much authority to kill fleeing felony suspects rests in the
hands of police officers and that a sharp curtailment of police
authority used for such a purpose is long overdue.
Use of lethal force is among the most controversial of police
activities.3 Indeed, fear of public condemnation expected in the
wake of police killings has prompted extreme countermeasures
on the part of at least one police department. There is substan-
tial evidence that the police department of Houston, Texas, led
by the department's top commanders, had encouraged line of-
*Professor of Law, ITT/Chicago Kent College of Law; B.S.E. Northern Illinois Univer-
sity, 1953; M.A. University of Illinois, 1960; J.D. DePaul University College of Law, 1960.
Mr. Michael Yusevicius, a law student at ITT/Chicago Kent College of Law, assisted in
the research for this article.
1. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Ash-
croft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
2. Garner v. Memphis Police Department, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
3. See Geller & Kareles, Shooting of and by Chicago Police: Uncommon Crisis Part
I: Shootings by Chicago Police, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1813 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Shootings by Chicago Police]. See also Littlejohn, Law and Police Misconduct,
58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 2, 173 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Police Misconduct).
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ficers to carry a second gun in addition to their regulation ser-
vice revolvers. The second gun, a so-called "drop gun," was to be
carried in anticipation of incidents in which unarmed civilians
were shot by police." The "drop gun" was to be placed next to,
or in the hands of, the shooting victim. A gun in the possession
of the shooting victim provided the officer responsible for the
death with a plausible explanation for his use of deadly force.
Occasions in which police employ deadly force against flee-
ing felony suspects represent a significant percentage of the
overall number of incidents in which lethal force is used by po-
lice. A study of police shootings in Chicago, Illinois, for example,
reported that for the years 1974-78, 89 civilians who allegedly
fled from the commission of serious offenses were shot by police
officers. This figure represents 17% of the total number of vic-
tims of police shootings in the period under study.5 Use of lethal
force in fleeing felon situations has claimed victims other than
the suspects pursued. In some cases, police officers have been
the victims of shots fired at fleeing suspects by fellow officers.
Most states bottom the right of police to use lethal force to
capture fleeing felony suspects on the felonious nature of the
crime allegedly committed or the use of force in the commission
of the crime. The modern legislative trend toward expansion of
the scope of criminal law-the identification of an increasing
number of activities as crime and the concomitant process of
elevating minor offenses to the status of major offenses-has
combined with the typical nature-of-the-crime basis for police
use of lethal force, to produce an enormous, virtually automatic
expansion of the police right to kill.
7
4. Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1227 (5th Cir. 1982).
5. Shootings by Chicago Police, supra note 3, at 1836.
6. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974).
7. Burglary provides an excellent example of the upgrading process. Although bur-
glary historically was considered to be a serious offense, the required elements-the
breaking and entry into a dwelling of another in the nighttime, with the intent to com-
mit a felony-sharply restricted the cases in which it was found to have been committed.
See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 192-213 (2d ed. 1969). Today, one seldom finds sharp
restriction of the type of premises entered or the time of entry required for the offense.
Nor is a breaking required in many codifications of the burglary offense. Activities once
considered minor trespasses now fall under the burglary heading. See, e.g., ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1 (1981); People v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245 (1968) (coin
laundromat open for use by the public). See also People v. Blair, 1 111. App. 3d 6, 272
N.E.2d 404 (1971) (open-ended car wash); People v. Embry, 12 Ill. App. 3d 332, 297
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The effect of expanded criminalization described above is
probably not a factor considered in legislative debates concern-
ing the enactment or revision of the criminal law itself. Never-
theless, the effect is of profound significance in the area of police
right to use lethal force. For example, in 1965, the Illinois legis-
lature included under the criminal offense of burglary the steal-
ing of any object from inside an automobile, even when the
transgression is committed by an action no more serious than
the offender reaching through the open window of a parked, un-
occupied vehicle. Burglary is classified as a forcible felony.8
Hence, in a state like Illinois, which permits police to use
lethal force against a suspect fleeing from commission of a forci-
ble felony, the offender who reached through the open window
of an unoccupied vehicle might be the lawful target of lethal
force used by a pursuing officer, if the offender could not other-
wise be immediately captured. This progressive expansion of po-
lice authority to use deadly force is fraught with danger, both for
individual suspects and for society as a whole." A by-product of
increased criminalization of behavior is the expansion of police
authority to kill citizens. Nothing less than comprehensive legis-
lative and judicial restrictions on the right of police to use
deadly force against fleeing felony suspects is necessary to prop-
erly limit this expanding authority. Self-limitation by individual
police departments, without other guarantees, is an inadequate
framework of protection.10
In a society which some perceive as overrun with crime and
criminals, advocacy of limitations on the authority of police to
use their weapons is sure to provoke an angry response. Some
would argue that after the fact observers of police action have
the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the advantage of producing their
reconstruction and evaluation in a calm, deliberative atmo-
N.E.2d 604 (1973) (a telephone booth was held to be the subject of a burglary).
For expansion of the criminal law into new areas, one only need look to today's
narcotic and drug laws.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1981).
9. See, e.g., Police Misconduct, supra note 3.
10. Note, Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force by the Police, 55 CHI-KENT L. REV.
539, 547 (1979). However, the Chief of Police of Minneapolis, Minnesota argued that
police department regulations and practices have effectively reduced homicides by police
officers in the line of duty. Bouza, Myths and Hard Truths About Police Shootings, 3 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 337, 339 (1982).
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sphere. The police officer, critics would say, does not have this
luxury when confronted with a split second decision regarding
the propensity for violence on the part of a suspect, or the likeli-
hood that an offender may be captured quickly without resort to
deadly force.
Hence, while we ponder rules of police behavior far from the
mean streets, it is well to remember the stark fact that the life of
a good police officer may be at times in the greatest jeopardy,
and that violent action may be the only reasonable response an
officer can make in a tense, life-threatening situation. Tamper-
ing too much with the right of police to exercise broad discretion
in the use of deadly force may promote an unwillingness by of-
ficers to be aggressive in pursuit of criminal suspects, lessening
police effectiveness and increasing the overall danger of violence
and criminality in society.
Nevertheless, it is maintained here that the law allows po-
lice overbroad authority in the use of lethal force against fleeing
felony suspects. In this area, it is argued, greater protection for
the suspect corresponds with general societal interests.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF A POLICE OFFICER'S USE OF
DEADLY FORCE
Paralleling the general expansion of police authority to use
deadly force is a trend toward use of section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 187111 by plaintiffs seeking redress in cases of al-
leged misuse of police power to kill. In pertinent part, section
1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. . ..
Since the objective of a civil law suit is the recovery of substan-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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tial money damages, the most attractive target in a suit based on
the misuse of police power is the municipal authority standing
behind the individual police officer. Availability of this adver-
sary to the plaintiff in a section 1983 action, however, depends
upon the extent to which municipalities are considered "per-
sons" for purposes of section 1983.
In Monroe v. Pape,2 the United States Supreme Court held
that the term "person" as used in section 1983 did not include
local governments. The Court reasoned that since liability ex-
tended expressly only to "persons," governmental liability did
not arise from a police officer's invasion of privacy, false arrest,
and wrongful detention. Under Monroe, it appeared that a
plaintiff's potential recovery would be limited to the relatively
meager financial resources of the individual officer who commit-
ted the alleged wrong and, perhaps, to that of the officer's imme-
diate supervisor. The possibility that a municipality might reim-
burse an officer in its employ who was forced to pay a judgment
in a section 1983 action, would not substantially enhance a
plaintiff's opportunity for a large recovery. The jury, typically
reluctant to impose heavy liability on an individual officer,
would not normally be told about the municipality's willingness
to pay the cost of judgment.
Despite the rather conclusive result in Monroe, the rule pro-
viding local government immunity under section 1983 was er-
roded in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser-
vices.13 In Monell, the Court decided that municipal liability
could indeed arise under section 1983, not under a theory of re-
spondeat superior, but where the conduct complained of was
part of official policy or custom, whether the policy or custom
was express or implied. Monell did not decide, however, whether
local governments retained some qualified immunity in section
1983 actions based upon an individual immunity of public of-
ficers. That question was addressed by the Court two years later
in Owen v. City of Independence."' In Owen, the Court con-
cluded that the municipality of Independence, Missouri did not
have even a qualified immunity from suit for the alleged mis-
12. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
13. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
14. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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deeds of the city manager and city council, although they acted
in good faith, so long as their misconduct arose under color of
their municipal office.15
The susceptibility of local governments as well as individual
police officers and police commanders to suit under section 1983,
described above, ensures that such action will be used increas-
ingly as the framework for challenges to police misuse of force in
every form. Section 1983 is especially attractive to plaintiffs
challenging official misconduct because the trial court may
award attorneys fees to the prevailing party.16
The United States Supreme Court, however, has not en-
tirely eliminated barriers to liability of municipalities under sec-
tion 1983. Soon after the Owen decision, the Court found that
punitive damages could not be recovered from a municipality. In
City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc.,' the Court observed
that there was nothing in the section 1983 legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended to deprive local governments of
their historic immunity from punitive damages liability; nor did
the Court see any public policy interest sufficient to overcome
traditional immunity. The cost of a punitive award, the Court
observed, would fall ultimately on the innocent taxpayer. 18
In any event, it seems clear that under the present state of
the law, local governments must clearly announce a policy
sharply narrowing the authority of police officers to rely upon
the use of deadly force, or face the prospect of liability under
section 1983 for the violation of victims' civil rights. Ironically, it
has been noted that restrictions on police use of force by either
police departments or municipalities, in excess of state law limi-
tations, may provide the basis for civil liability that would not
otherwise arise under state law. 9
Regrettably, the reaction of police and prosecutors to
threatened civil rights actions often is limited to a search for
15. Although it has been noted that § 1983 provides no express immunities, the Court
has held that prosecutors are totally immune from suit under § 1983 for acts done as
part of the prosecutorial or judicial function. That limitation persists. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
17. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
18. Id. at 267.




means to discourage potential plaintiffs from pursuing com-
plaints. For example, attempts may be made to thwart civil suits
by threatening complainants with criminal prosecution. The typ-
ical scenario finds the police or prosecution attempting to elicit a
promise from the prospective complainant not to bring a civil
action or internal disciplinary complaint, in exchange for dismis-
sal of a pending or potential criminal complaint, whether or not
the criminal charge is well founded. This kind of activity has
been successfully disguised within the plea bargaining process.
Where coercion exercised against a complainant has been ex-
posed, it has been condemned by courts as violative of citizens'
first amendment right to complain about the alleged misconduct
of an officer and to resort to the remedy of a civil suit.2 In any
event, it is unlikely that any promise by a victim of official mis-
conduct not to sue in exchange for the dismissal or withholding
of a criminal charge would be binding. It is likely that such a
promise would be found void as a product of unlawful coercion.2 1
Perhaps the most appalling recent example of unlawful offi-
cial action to avoid the consequences of excessive use of deadly
force by police is found in Webster v. City of Houston,22 men-
tioned above. In that case it was found that Houston police of-
ficers had been taught, from their police training days on, to
carry a second hand gun with them, in addition to their service
revolvers, to lay next to a civilian victim who had been shot by
police, where the victim was in fact initially unarmed. As to that
practice, the Webster court concluded:
20. See MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1970); Dixon v. District of Co-
lumbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), a woman automobile passenger
told the police officer of her unhappiness with police performance following the officer's
citation of the driver, her husband, for an alleged traffic violation. The language the
woman used was plainly insulting and profane. As a result, the officer charged her with a
city ordinance violation which made it an offense to "wantonly curse or revile, or to use
obscene or opprobrious language" to a police officer. The Court reversed the conviction,
holding that, under the first amendment, a citizen has a right to express her opinion
about the work of a police officer in strong language. See also United States v. Steele,
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (to successfully invoke the defense of discriminatory prose-
cution, a defendant must establish that the police officer's choice to prosecute him was
based on an unjustifiable standard which violates his rights to due process under the
fourteenth amendment).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).
22. 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982).
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[T]he use of a throw down weapon was well nigh univer-
sal throughout the police department. From their earlier
days in the police academy, recruits surreptitiously learn
to 'protect themselves' by employing a throw down ....
[Use of a throw down was] a living part of official policy
at HPD.
In short, the Houston police department employed a systematic
scheme for falsifying the evidence surrounding the use of lethal
force by police. This falsification of evidence was not only con-
doned, but encouraged at the highest police command level.
24
Hence, our brief review of the potential for relief from abu-
sive police practices in the use of deadly force through civil liti-
gation indicates that relief by this method has been partial, and
that the method itself is strongly resisted by police. For restric-
tion of police discretion to use deadly force against fleeing felony
suspects, we must look beyond the remedy of the individual civil
suit.
DEADLY FORCE DEFINED
Section 3:11 (2) of the Model Penal Code defines deadly
force as:
force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or
which he knows will create a substantial risk of causing
death or serious bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm
in the direction of another person or at a vehicle in which
another person is believed to be constitutes deadly
force."
The foregoing definition of deadly force adequately de-
scribes the phenomenon for our purposes. Note that the defini-
tion of deadly force hinges upon the weapon used and the state
of mind of the actor, not upon the outcome. A suspect's death
may occur in a variety of circumstances, though force usually
viewed as short of deadly is used: e.g., striking a blow with a fist.
23. Id. at 1227.
24. Id.
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also Comment,
Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
361, 363 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Deadly Force to Arrest).
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The fist may cause death in an unusual situation, but a fist alone
is not usually considered a deadly weapon. For our purposes,
deadly force will be taken to include force involved in the use of
inherently deadly weapons only: guns, knives, etc.
COMMON LAW-FLEEING SUSPECT
Simply stated, it was the common law rule that lethal force
could not be used to effect the arrest of a person suspected of
committing a misdemeanor, even though failure to use such
force would result in the escape of the suspected offender. 6 On
the other hand, if it reasonably appeared to the officer that only
through the use of deadly force could one suspected of any fel-
ony be prevented from escaping, then without exception the use
of deadly force was authorized. 7
Contemporary decisions based on the common law are not
consistent regarding a police officer's right to use deadly force to
arrest a person where the felony was not committed in the pres-
ence of the officer. In most American jurisdictions, the officer
may use deadly force when necessary to effect the arrest,
whether or not the crime occurred in the presence of the officer,
provided there is probable cause to believe that the suspect com-
mitted the felony. A more restrictive standard is maintained by
a few common law based jurisdictions: specifically, deadly force
may be used only when the crime was committed in the presence
of the officer.2 In most jurisdictions in which the use of deadly
force by police officers is governed by statute, lawfulness has
been made to hinge, in this respect, upon whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that the offense occurred and that the
party against whom force is used is the offender.2
The common law rule authorizing the use of lethal force to
capture a suspect fleeing from any felony, where less drastic ac-
tion would not reasonably appear to accomplish the task, was
based in large measure upon the fact that during the develop-
ment of the early common law in England, the death penalty
was imposed upon almost all convicted felons.30 Thus, there was
26. See Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 25.
27. Id. at 364.
28. LAFAVE & Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 404-05 (1972).
29. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW, 1100-01 (3d ed. 1982).
30. Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33
19831
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relatively little disproportion between the penalty of death on
conviction and death at the hands of a pursuing police officer.
Today, however, society has sharply restricted those crimes for
which the death penalty may be imposed. In the United States,
the death penalty may be imposed only where the offender has
been convicted of murder, and then only in special circum-
stances.31 If the offender has been convicted of murder, but guilt
is found on the basis of accessoryship or principleship of a lesser
degree, for example, when the convicted party is not the actual
killer, the state's authority to impose the death penalty is doubt-
ful.3 2 Furthermore, upon conviction, the felon sentenced to
death has available a host of post conviction review procedures.
In short, since the days of the early common law, society has
determined that the sentence of death is appropriate in only a
miniscule number of cases, and then, only after the most pains-
taking of judicial investigations. In contrast, the continuing right
of police in many jurisdictions to utilize deadly force in a wide
variety of circumstances to capture fleeing felony suspects
reserves for the police a degree of authority which society has
deemed excessive even in the hands of the nation's highest
tribunals. As a result, some state legislatures have responded to
our changing philosophy of punishment by limiting police use of
lethal force. Approximately twenty-three states, however, have
not materially changed the common law rule on police use of
lethal force to capture a fleeing felony suspect.3 3 It is urged here
VAND. L. REV. 71, 74 (1980).
31. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty punishment is excessive for
rape conviction); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (statute which re-
quires the death penalty whenever a defendant is found guilty of murder in the first
degree violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments).
32. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). However, in People v. Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d 245, 447 N.E.2d 148
(1982), the Illinois Supreme Court held that Enmund does not bar the death penalty for
offenders who, though they are not the actual killers, were substantially involved in the
killings and intended the acts which eventually led to the killings.
33. Typically, jurisdictions that have codified the common law rule permit a police
officer to use lethal force to stop a fleeing felon when he reasonably believes that such
use of force is necessary. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-510 (1947). Other jurisdictions
require that a reasonable police officer would, in the same situation, use lethal force. See,
e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140 (1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (1983) (any felon);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2512 (1947) (any felon); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22(C2)
(1958) (police officer must reasonably believe that the person pursued committed or at-
[Vol. 1
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that considerably greater restraint upon police is sorely needed.
There is no review procedure that will revive the suspect killed
by a police officer.
CONCEPTS UNDERLYING LEGISLATION AND COURT DECISIONS
LIMITING THE AUTHORITY OF POLICE TO USE DEADLY FORCE
No one has yet seriously suggested that police use of lethal
force be limited to occasions on which the offense involved is
murder, nor is such a suggestion made here. Persons suspected
of crimes deemed less serious than murder may present an im-
mediate threat to human life when at large and the need to cap-
ture such persons is justification for the use of deadly force by
police. Hence, it is argued here that society's general interests
are best served by a regulation of police use of lethal force which
strikes an accommodation between the harsh common law rule
authorizing the use of lethal force against all fleeing felony sus-
pects and modern judicial punishment restrictions.
One of the more popular legislative modifications of the
common law rule regarding the police officer's right to use
deadly force follows the line of limiting the right to cases involv-
ing forcible felonies, i.e., rape, robbery, burglary, murder and
tempted to commit a felony); FLA. STAT. § 776-05 (1961) (use of lethal force is permitted
when necessary to apprehend any felon). In California a police officer is permitted to use
lethal force to effect an arrest for any felony. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West 1954). How-
ever, in 1977, the California Court of Appeals held that despite the language of the stat-
ute, police officers were permitted to use lethal force only when the suspect was believed
to have committed a forcible felony. According to the court, interpretation of the statute
to encompass any felony would render it unconstitutional. Kortum v. Alkite, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 26 (Cal. App. 1977).
Some jurisdictions have promulgated the common law rule through case law. In
Maiorana v. MacDonald, 598 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1979), the court of appeals held that to
use lethal force a police officer must reasonably believe in good faith that such force is
necessary to effectuate the felony arrest. In Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 863 (D. Md.
1930), the court held that a police officer may use lethal force against anyone who has
committed or may reasonably be believed to have committed a felony. In other case law
jurisdictions, the police officer is permitted to use lethal force when he reasonably be-
lieves that it is necessary to effectuate a felony arrest. See, e.g., Jackson v. District of
Columbia, 412 A.2d 948 (D.C. App. 1980); Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Stube, 11 Md. 119, 73
A. 697 (1909); Commonwealth v. Young, 362 Mass. 597, 96 N.E.2d 133 (1950). In People
v. Doss, 406 Mich. 90, 276 N.W.2d 9 (1979), the court held that police have the right to
use lethal force when such use is reasonable under all of the circumstances. Those cir-
cumstances must include a reasonable belief that there is great danger to the individual
officer or to others.
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
like offenses, or offenses where deadly force was actually used or
threatened, regardless of how the crime is otherwise character-
ized. Some have suggested even more restrictive rules. One of
the most carefully considered court opinions advocating sub-
stantially greater limitations upon police use of deadly force
than those contained in most current state statutes is Mattis v.
Schnarr.
3 4
The Schnarr case was a civil suit under section 1983 arising
out of the killing of an eighteen year old youth who had broken
into an unoccupied office of a golf driving range. The decedent
was unarmed, and was sufficiently fleet of foot to have escaped
pursuing officers, had not one officer shot and killed the of-
fender. The officer had shouted a warning that he would shoot if
decedent did not stop. Decedent did not stop and the officer
fired the fatal bullet.
35
The case arose under a Missouri statute which permitted an
officer to use deadly force against a fleeing suspect if the person
had committed any felony and it reasonably appeared that his
escape could not be prevented except by the use of deadly force:
essentially the common law rule.3 Decedent's father, as plaintiff,
argued that the statute violated on its face the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment because
the life and death authority vested in the police by the statute
allowed police to kill suspected offenders even when the crimes
allegedly committed were relatively minor. Further, the father
argued that the use of force against his son was unreasonable
because there was no evidence that the suspect had presented
any real danger to the police or the public."
The Eighth Circuit could see little reason for the continua-
tion of an English common law rule of ancient origins, developed
under vastly different conditions from those prevailing today. As
the court noted, English common law, when adopted in a United
States jurisdiction, must be interpreted in light of the limita-
tions on state action imposed by the United States
34. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc), vacated sub noma. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431
U.S. 171 (1977).
35. 547 F.2d at 1009.
36. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 559.040-.190 (Vernon 1970), amended by § 563.046 (Vernon
1979).




Proceeding from this foundation, the court concluded that
where the maximum penalty authorized by legislation for the
commission of a crime is significantly less severe than death, it is
a gross anomaly to permit the state to kill the suspect through
police action, merely because use of lethal force was necessary to
apprehend the suspect immediately. The offense committed in
Schnarr was breaking and entering into an unoccupied store, a
crime not usually threatening to life. Nor was the offender him-
self a potential threat to human life. He displayed no weapons
and he fled on foot.3' Although the offense in Schnarr was cat-
agorized as burglary, a forcible felony under modern criminal
statutes and a serious felony at common law because it applied
only to nighttime entries into dwellings, the acts of the Schnarr
offender were far less grave than the "forcible" classification of
the crime indicates. The offender's death in Schnarr, at the
hands of a pursuing police officer, exceeded enormously any pen-
alty that a judge might impose. Moreover, the court noted, the
right to trial and all the ancilliary proceedings that that right
entails must be strictly satisfied under the Constitution before
the duly authorized sentencing agency, the court, can impose
punishment.4 0 When the decision to use deadly force against a
suspect is made by a police officer, no such due process protec-
tions exist.
The fundamental constitutional right of the fleeing felony
suspect to life, guaranteed by the fifth4' and fourteenth42
amendments, should give way to police authority to use deadly
force only if the state can demonstrate an equivalent or greater
interest in permitting police to use deadly force to effect the of-
fender's capture. In situations where the suspect presents a
grave threat to the bodily security of the police officer or the
general public, such an interest is present. Commission of a
crime classified as a felony, however, is not enough by itself to
show that the suspect presents the required grave threat. Felo-
nies, the Schnarr court says, "are infinite in their complexity,
38. Id. at 1017.
39. Id. at 1009.
40. Id. at 1018.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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ranging from the violent to the victimless. The police officer can-
not be constitutionally vested with the power and authority to
kill any and all escaping felons, including the thief who steals an
ear of corn, as well as one who kills and ravishes at will."43
Thus, the court found the Missouri statute authorizing the
use of deadly force against all fleeing felons, the statute on
which the police officers in Schnarr relied, unconstitutional. Un-
derlying the Schnarr decision was the court's perception that
use of deadly force against the suspect fleeing unarmed from a
non-violent burglary had exacted a punishment grossly dispro-
portionate to the crime committed, a punishment executed on
the spot without benefit of mandated procedural protections.
Although the Schnarr decision was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court on unrelated grounds, the Eighth Circuit
has reiterated the rule in Schnarr in a subsequent case," and
that decision remains in force. The Schnarr rule has had a
mixed reception in the courts. The Alaska Supreme Court, in
dictum, has agreed with the Schnarr rule,4  but the Minnesota
Supreme Court has rejected it."' The position of the Sixth Cir-
cuit on a similar question in Wiley v. Memphis Police Depart-
ment 47 and Garner v. Memphis Police Department 8 is dis-
cussed below.49 Despite the significance of the Schnarr decision
for potential liability of local political subdivisions arising out of
police use of deadly force against fleeing felony suspects, the
case has prompted little action in state legislatures, even those
43. 547 F.2d at 1020.
44. Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912
(1978). Landrum involved the police killing of a suspected burglar of a gasoline station.
The station was closed at the time of the offense, the suspect was unarmed, and the
police had no reason to believe that the suspect was carrying a weapon. Nebraska state
law was interpreted to limit police use of deadly force to those cases in which the fleeing
suspect threatened to use or did use deadly force in the crime, or where the police be-
lieved that there was a substantial risk that the suspect would cause death or great bod-
ily harm unless captured immediately. In attempting to establish their good faith, police
defendants relied upon a police department directive permitting officers to use deadly
force to capture any person suspected of committing any felony, when deadly force ap-
peared to be the only way to effect an immediate arrest. See also Russ v. Ratliff, 538
F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
45. State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).
46. Schuman v. St. Paul, 268 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. 1978).
47. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
48. 710 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 50-61.
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within the Eighth Circuit. The importance of the issues ad-
dressed in Schnarr and the implications of the approach used by
the Eighth Circuit, however, guarantee that the decision will be
influential in the courts and legislatures of other jurisdictions in
the future.
SIXTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS: WILEY AND GARNER
Soon after the Mattis v. Schnarr decision, the Sixth Circuit
faced a challenge to a Tennessee statute that authorized police
to use deadly force in pursuit of a fleeing felony suspect. In Wi-
ley v. Memphis Police Department5" a sixteen year old youth
had been killed by police fire as the youth was attempting to flee
from the nighttime burglary of a sporting goods store. Police
found two shotguns and ammunition taken from the burglarized
store next to the dead body of the offender. 1
The court's conclusion that pursuing police were aware that
firearms were present in the burglarized premises, and the weap-
ons and ammunition found near the fatally wounded suspect,"'
lessened the relevance of the case for purposes of comparison
with Schnarr. Nevertheless, two judges of the three judge Sixth
Circuit panel in Wiley expressed hostility to the Schnarr ruling,
characterizing it in the language of the Schnarr dissent as a rec-
ognition of a "constitutional right to commit felonious offenses
and to escape the consequences of those offenses."53
Two years later a different Sixth Circuit panel addressed
the deadly force issue in Garner v. Memphis Police Depart-
ment,5" a case factually similar to Schnarr. In Garner, an
unarmed fifteen year old boy was killed by police while fleeing
from the burglary of an unoccupied residence. Before firing the
fatal shots, the officer had shined his flashlight upon the boy as
the boy was attempting to scale a fence. The officer clearly saw
that the offender was a youth and was apparently unarmed. 5
The father of the decedent sued the city and the individual
50. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
51. Id. at 1249.
52. Id. at 1251.
53. Id. at 1253 (quoting Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1023) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
54. 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 53.
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officers involved under section 1983 for wrongful death resulting
from violations of the fourth, eighth and fourteenth
amendments."
In its first consideration of the Garner case, the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the district court that the individ-
ual officer who shot the fleeing suspect was not liable in a section
1983 suit because the officer had relied in good faith on Tennes-
see law which permitted police to use deadly force against flee-
ing felons if capture could not be effected by other means. In
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell,
5
7
however, the Sixth Circuit overruled the district court's dismis-
sal of the father's section 1983 action against the city.
Garner was argued before the Sixth Circuit again in Janu-
ary of 1983 after the district court, on remand, had found no
constitutional violation in the challenged police action.58 The
court of appeals held that the Tennessee statute authorizing po-
lice to use deadly force against fleeing felony suspects to prevent
their escape, although the suspects are unarmed and nonviolent,
violated the fourth amendment protection against an unreasona-
ble seizure of the person, as well as fourteenth amendment due
process rights."
Furthermore, the court found that the Tennessee statute
was unconstitutional "because it does not put sufficient limits on
the use of deadly force. It is 'too disproportionate.' It does not
make distinctions based upon 'gravity and need' nor on the
'magnitude of the offense.' "60
Although the Sixth Circuit quoted Schnarr with approval,"
the constitutional restrictions on police use of deadly force to
capture fleeing felony suspects as delineated by the Sixth Circuit
are more limited than those set out in Schnarr. "The officers
may be justified in using deadly force," the Sixth Circuit found,
"if the suspect has committed a violent crime or if they have
probable cause to believe that he is armed or that he will endan-
56. Id.
57. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1979).
58. Garner v. Memphis Police Department, 710 F.2d 240, 242 (6th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 246.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 247.
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ger the physical safety of others if not captured. ' " As noted by
the court, the standard it announced follows the outline of the
Model Penal Code. 3 The Code provisions on the use of deadly
force by police officers, examined below, represent a substantial,
if not wholly adequate, restriction of police power.
COMMONLY FOUND MODIFICATIONS OF LETHAL FORCE AUTHORITY
Despite the tremendous expansion of the modern criminal
law, the willingness of society to provide extensive procedural
guarantees within the criminal justice system, and the abolition
of degrees of criminal involvement, large numbers of jurisdic-
tions in the United States retain what is in substance the old
common law rule regarding the use of lethal force by police in
pursuit of a felony suspect.6 4 Even in those jurisdictions where
modifications have been made, it is suggested here, restrictions
on police authority to use lethal force against fleeing felony sus-
pects have not gone far enough. 5
62. Id. at 246.
63. Id. at 247.
64. See supra text accompanying note 33.
65. The following summarizes the law limiting police use of deadly force to arrest
fleeing felony suspects in some states that have departed from the common law rule.
In Virginia, police may use deadly force, if necessary, to effect arrest only for "capi-
tal felonies," not minor ones. Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 8, 10 (Va. 1935).
New Hampshire permits a police officer to use deadly force if he reasonably believes the
offender has committed a felony and is using a deadly weapon to escape, or if the of-
fender is otherwise likely to seriously endanger human life if not captured. Before using
deadly force, however, the officer must make a reasonable effort to warn the offender
that he is a policeman attempting to effect an arrest. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5
(1974). In Kansas, a police officer may use deadly force to arrest a fleeing felon who is
using a deadly weapon to escape, or who has otherwise indicated that he will endanger
human life unless arrested without delay. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215 (1981). In Alaska, a
peace officer may use deadly force to arrest for any felony involving the use of force
against the person, or any offense where the suspect is escaping while in possession of a
firearm, or any offense where the suspect's escape will endanger lives of others. ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.370 (1962). The relevant Colorado statute authorizes the use of deadly
force by a peace officer when the crime is a felony and the suspect used a deadly weapon.
Also, while authorizing the use of deadly force to arrest a suspect fleeing in a manner
dangerous to others, Colorado specifically eliminated from this category the suspect flee-
ing in a motor vehicle and violating motor vehicle laws. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707
(1973). In Hawaii, peace officers may use deadly force to arrest for any felony involving
use of deadly force or any felony where there is substantial risk a fleeing suspect will
cause death or serious bodily injury unless captured without delay. Such use of deadly
force, however, is only justifiable if the peace officer believes the force employed does not
create a substantial risk of injury to innocent persons. HAWAI REV. STAT. § 703-307
190 HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. 1
A frequently employed legislative modification of common
(1976). Illinois authorizes a peace officer, or anyone he has summoned to assist him, to
use deadly force to arrest for a forcible felony, or any offense where the suspect is using a
deadly weapon to escape, or any offense in which the suspect otherwise indicates he will
endanger human life if not captured without delay. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1981).
In Iowa, a peace officer may use deadly force to arrest when the suspect has used deadly
force in commission of a felony or when the officer believes the suspect would use deadly
force unless immediately apprehended. IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.8 (West 1979). Kentucky
allows a peace officer to use deadly force to arrest a suspect who used deadly force in
commission of a felony or who is otherwise likely to endanger human life unless cap-
tured. Ky. REV. STAT. § 503.090 (1975). A Maine law enforcement officer may use deadly
force to arrest a suspect whom he reasonably believes has committed any offense involv-
ing the use of deadly force or is otherwise likely to seriously endanger human life or
cause serious bodily injury if not captured. Before using deadly force, the officer must
make a reasonable effort to warn the fleeing suspect that he is a law enforcement officer
attempting to effect an arrest. The warning is not necessary, however, if the officer rea-
sonably believes the suspect already knows he is being pursued by the officer. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (1964). In Minnesota, a peace officer may use deadly force
only when necessary to effect an arrest for a felony involving the use of deadly force, or a
felony where the officer believes the fleeing suspect will cause death or great bodily harm
unless captured without delay. The statute specifically states that it provides no defense
to a peace officer in a civil suit brought by an innocent third party injured as a result of
the officer's use of deadly force in effecting an arrest. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.066 (West
Supp. 1983). A peace officer in Nebraska, or a person authorized to assist him, is justified
in using deadly force when he believes it necessary to effect an arrest for a felony involv-
ing use of deadly force or a felony where there is substantial risk the suspect will cause
death or serious bodily harm if apprehension is delayed. The officer must also believe the
force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-1412 (1979). New Jersey allows a peace officer, or a person authorized to assist him,
to use deadly force to effect an arrest for the commission or attempted commission of
homicide, kidnapping, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, arson, robbery, or burglary
of a dwelling. The force used must not create a substantial risk of injury to innocent
persons. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-7 (West 1982). New York allows a peace officer to use
deadly force to arrest for any felony or attempted felony involving use of physical force
against the person, for any offense where the fleeing suspect is armed with a deadly
weapon or firearm, and for kidnapping, arson, escape first degree, and burglary first de-
gree. The statute specifically states that it provides no defense for an officer who uses
deadly force recklessly with respect to innocent persons. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (Mc-
Kinney 1975 & Supp. 1982). A North Carolina law enforcement officer may use deadly
force to arrest any offender who is using a deadly weapon to escape or who otherwise
presents an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to others unless appre-
hended. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (1978). Deadly force may be used by a Pennsylvania
peace officer to arrest or prevent escape when reasonably believed necessary in forcible
felony cases, or whatever the offense where the offender is escaping with a deadly
weapon or otherwise indicates he will endanger the lives of others unless arrested with-
out delay. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508 (Purdon 1983). In Texas, a peace officer, or
person authorized to act for him, may use whatever force necessary, regardless of the
offense, when the officer reasonably believes the offender used deadly force or will cause
death or serious injury unless arrested without delay. However, the officer must first
make an effort to announce his purpose and identity, unless he reasonably believes his
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law police authority to use deadly force against fleeing suspects
is the limitation of that authority to crimes involving force, e.g.
murder, manslaughter, robbery, burglary, arson, and other like
offenses. As noted above however, too many offenses, such as
burglary under expanded legislative definitions, are classified as
forcible although the behavior involved falls far short of consti-
tuting a serious threat to police or public security.
Many of those states modifying the common law rule have
adopted restrictions tracking those contained in the Model Pe-
nal Code. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, in
the 1962 official draft, recommends the following legislation on
police authority to use deadly force to complete an arrest:
Section 3.07. Use of Force in Law Enforcement
(1) Use of Force Justifiable to Effect an Arrest. Subject
to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the
use of force upon or toward the person of another is justi-
fiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an
arrest and the actor believes that such force is immedi-
ately necessary to effect a lawful arrest.
(2) Limitations on the Use of Force.
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Sec-
tion unless:
(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the ar-
rest or believes that it is otherwise known by or
cannot reasonably be made known to the person
to be arrested; and
(ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the
warrant is valid or believed by the actor to be
valid.
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under
this Section unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to
act as a peace officer or is assisting a person whom
identity is already known to the suspect or cannot be made known to him. TEXAS PENAL
CODE ANN. § 9.51 (Vernon 1974). In Utah, a peace officer, or persons acting under his
direction, may use deadly force to arrest for a forcible felony, when the offender is using
a deadly weapon to escape, or when the offender's escape will endanger human life. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-404 (1978).
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he believes to be authorized to act as a peace of-
ficer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed
creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent
persons; and
(iv) the actor believes that:
(1) the crime for which the arrest is made in-
volved conduct including the use or
threatened use of deadly force; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to
be arrested will cause death or serious bodily
harm if his apprehension is delayed.
(3) Use of Force to Prevent Escape from Custody. The
use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person
from custody is justifiable when the force could justifia-
bly have been employed to effect the arrest under which
the person is in custody, except that a guard or other
person authorized to act as a peace officer is justified in
using any force, including deadly force, which he believes
to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a
person from a jail, prison, or other institution for the de-
tention of persons charged with or convicted of a crime.66
In pertinent summary, the Model Penal Code does not focus
on the classification of the crime allegedly committed, but rather
upon the potential danger of the pursued offender, or the use of
force in the perpetration of the offense itself. By linking the
right of police to use deadly force to the demonstrated danger-
ousness of the offender to police or the public, the Code repre-
sents a significant step toward enforcing a measure of propor-
tionality in the offense/police response equation. Although it is
an advance on the common law and upon those modifications of
the common law that remain focused on the classification of the
crime as the standard by which police authority to use deadly
force in pursuit of an offender is determined, the Model Code
approach is not without flaws.
Specifically, the Model Penal Code, along with other com-
mon law modifications noted above, ignores the question of the
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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appropriateness of the use of lethal force against fleeing felony
suspects who are involved in violent offenses, but to a considera-
bly lesser degree, and who may not have been aware of the use
of violence in the crime. For example, the conspirator who per-
forms a relatively minor role in a burglary, remaining outside
the premises to provide a warning of approaching danger, might
be totally unaware that his confederates inside the premises
have killed the householder. Yet such an individual might, under
the Model Penal Code, be the subject of the lawful use of lethal
force by pursuing police officers. The same is true for the of-
fender whose involvement ended before the crime took place
and who did not contemplate the eruption of violence during the
completion of the crime. Indeed, it was precisely because of the
comprehensive utilization of the death penalty for almost all fel-
ony offenders at common law that the law developed the catego-
ries of degrees of involvement in crime. That is, categories of
involvement were created to prevent the conviction as principals
of persons less involved in given crimes because, if convicted as
principals, they would be likely to face the death penalty.
Historically, accessories were divided into three categories:
accessories before the fact, those who aided, procured, or en-
couraged the offender in his criminal enterprise prior to the per-
petration but who were not present at the time and place of the
crime; accessories after the fact, those who were not present at
the time of the crime but who aided the offender to escape ap-
prehension; and, accessories to the crime itself, those present at
the scene of the crime with intent to aid the perpetrator. Acces-
soryship at the time of the crime was abolished by the common
law early on and replaced with the concept of principal in the
second degree. The principal in the first degree was the actual
perpetrator." As resort to the death penalty became less fre-
quent, the need for precision in the classification of degrees of
involvement lessened.
Legislatures responded by eventually abolishing the acces-
soryship and principal in degree categories with the exception,
generally, of the category of accessory after the fact. Today, all
involved in a crime typically are grouped together under a single
67. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 669-70 (2d ed. 1969).
68. See generally id. at 643-85.
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
principalship heading. For the purposes of the authority of po-
lice officers to use deadly force against fleeing suspects, the re-
sult of eliminating concepts of degree and accessoryship is to
vastly increase the scope of police power.
It is not argued here that we return to an era of categoriza-
tion of degrees of criminal involvement. Nevertheless, if the ba-
sis for the use of lethal force to apprehend a fleeing suspect is
the classification of crime committed or, as in the Model Penal
Code, the force used in the commission of the crime, is it not
logical to consider degrees of criminal involvement in determin-
ing when the police may use lethal force if the suspect pursued
is presently unarmed? The argument is useful to demonstrate
the problems inherent in an approach to limitation of police au-
thority based upon the use of violence in the commission of the
crime.
Neither modification of the common law rule defining the
authority of police to use lethal force in the apprehension of a
fleeing suspect, discussed above, entirely satisfies the need of our
society for physical security of citizens. Nor does current law in
most juridsictions provide police with a workable standard to
apply quickly in arriving at the decision to use deadly force to
capture or stop a fleeing suspected offender. Accordingly it is
urged here that a different standard be employed. The test for
allowing police to resort to deadly weapons to stop the flight of
any suspect should hinge exclusively upon a reasonable belief
that the particular offender pursued is armed and/or dangerous
to human life. This simple test appears to be a practical one for
police officers who would have to use it in circumstances of ex-
traordinary pressure. It would permit police to act entirely upon
what they actually observe in their pursuit of a suspect. Officers
would not be encouraged to speculate about what occurred at
the scene of a crime nor to test their knowledge of the some-
times obscure concepts of crime classification.
CONCLUSION
Few legislatures and few courts have exhibited enthusiasm
for the creation of stricter limitations on police authority to use
deadly force in effecting the capture of fleeing felony suspects.
Crime is regarded as one of our nation's most pressing concerns,
and popular political wisdom maintains that the public wants
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more power and discretion placed in the hands of police, not
less.
Yet there is something very wrong with a system of law that
allows police officers to kill many more people in many more sit-
uations than a court can order killed after a criminal trial is
completed.
Our nation prides itself on being a government of laws, not
men, and on its willingness to provide constitutional protections
in the judicial process even to the most depraved and despised
of its citizens. Despite this environment of concern for constitu-
tional rights, most states today follow what is substantially the
common law rule permitting police broad life and death author-
ity over the lives of fleeing felony suspects. Because of the ex-
pansion of the number of crimes considered felonies in modern
penal codes, adherence to the common law rule serves to vastly
increase the scope of the police right to kill. It is ironic that as
the state's authority to take the life of a convicted offender has
been sharply reduced, the right of police officers to take the life
of a suspect prior to trial has been sharply and consistently ex-
panded. Clearly, the common law justification for police author-
ity to kill fleeing felony suspects: that is, that the captured felon
would almost surely be executed for his crime, is invalid today.
Currently, many states forbid the death penalty, and those
that permit it do so in only the most limited circumstances. Po-
lice power to kill fleeing felony suspects creates a framework in
which the penalty of death can be performed outside of the judi-
cial process for the commission of relatively minor offenses.
While the situation is not as dramatic in those states that have
modified the common law rule, even those states allow police au-
thority before trial far in excess of the power of the court after
trial.
In many communities, relations between citizens and the
police are strained. Police shootings that result in the death of
fleeing suspects serve to heighten community hostility toward
law enforcement officers. The community is quick to perceive a
disproportion between the seriousness of the crime allegedly
committed by the fleeing suspect and the penalty exacted by po-
lice. Broken ties between citizens and police take a toll on soci-
ety in diminished police effectiveness.
It is urged here that the public interest is best served by
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limiting police authority to use lethal force against fleeing felony
suspects to those cases in which the suspect pursued is reasona-
bly believed to present an immediate threat to life. The classifi-
cation of the suspected offense should play no role in determin-
ing the right of police to use deadly weapons. This test is simple
in applicaton, for it hinges on what the pursuing officers actually
observe, not on speculation about what occurred at the crime
scene nor on the officers' understanding of the classification of
criminal offenses. The standard proposed here also promises to
achieve a greater proportionality between the seriousness of the
crime allegedly committed and the punishment carried out. Our
society requires fairness in criminal proceedings. That require-
ment is not waived against a fleeing felony suspect. Flight alone
should not expose a suspect to possible death at the hands of
police.
